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Abstract 
Can managers enhance social responsibility while also improving profitability?  Research 
demonstrates that there are “win-win” investments that improve both socially desirable outcomes 
and the bottom line, from energy and the environment to wages and workplace safety.  Yet many 
such opportunities are not taken—money is left on the table.  Here we explore this puzzle using the 
case of energy efficiency in a large research university, a setting that should favor implementation of 
win-win actions.  However, despite a long time horizon, large endowment and pro-social mission, 
the university failed to implement many programs offering both large environmental and financial 
benefits.  Using ethnographic field study and panel regression we develop a novel simulation model 
integrating energy use, maintenance, and facilities renewal.  We find that the organization 
inadvertently fell into a capability trap in which poor performance prevented investments in win-win 
opportunities and the capabilities needed to realize them, perpetuating poor performance.  Escaping 
the trap requires investments large enough and sustained long enough to cross tipping thresholds 
that convert the vicious cycle into a virtuous cycle of better performance, greater investment and still 
better performance.  We discuss how the organization is escaping from the trap and whether the 
results generalize to other contexts. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  capabilities, capability trap, corporate social responsibility, energy efficiency, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars and managers argue that organizations can take socially responsible actions that 
also improve the bottom line, creating both private gain and public goods in domains from the 
environment to wages, working conditions, safety and public health (e.g. Porter & Lind 1995, 
Christmann 2000, Gunningham et al. 2003, Levine, Toffel & Johnson 2012, Ton and Huckman 
2009, Ton 2014). Such ‘win-win’ actions include many investments that cut energy use, greenhouse 
gas emissions and air pollution and yield positive net present value and short payback times (e.g., 
Creyts et al. 2007, Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010, Fuerst and Mcallister 2011, Hawken, Lovins & 
Lovins 1999; Lovins 2012, Mills 2011, Moser et al. 2012, Sullivan et al. 2010).  Pro-social investments 
can also enhance competitive advantage by anticipating future regulatory requirements (Hart 1995, 
Gunningham et al. 2003), building relationships with important stakeholders and strengthening 
reputation (Coglianese & Nash 2001, Parker 2002, Barnett 2007, Estlund 2010, Locke 2013).   
Despite widespread evidence documenting win-win investments organizations often fail to make 
them.  Consider the case of buildings and physical infrastructure.  Simple actions can generate 
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substantial energy savings with positive net present value (NPV) and short payback times (e.g., 
Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010, Fuerst and Mcallister 2011, Mills 2011, Moser et al. 2012, Sullivan 
et al. 2010), yet organizations often underinvest, leaving win-win opportunities on the table (e.g. 
Effinger et al., 2009, DeCanio 1998, TIAX 2005, Perez-Lombard et al. 2008, Charles 2009). Amin 
(2011) estimates that upgrading the US electrical grid would more than pay for itself through 
reduced outage costs and improved reliability, and McKinsey (2010) found 12 GtCO2e/year of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—nearly a third of the global total—can be abated with existing 
technologies at negative cost.  Industrial accidents frequently destroy firm value, harm the 
environment and cost lives, yet are often easily avoided.  For example, the 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
blowout, 2008 Imperial Sugar refinery explosion, and 2010 Upper Big Branch mine disaster—
collectively causing 54 deaths—were all preventable through inexpensive investments in equipment, 
maintenance and safety (National Commission 2011, US Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation 
Board 2009, US Department of Labor 2010).     
Why are win-win opportunities so often left on the table?  Organizational theory on socially 
responsible action is largely silent on the question.  Social responsibility is often examined in the 
context of debates regarding the theory of the firm as it relates to shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston 1995; Freeman 1999; Margolis & Walsh 2003).  Empirical 
studies often associate socially responsible actions with firm performance, industry or geography 
(e.g., McGuire et al. 1988, McWilliams & Siegel 2001), the institutional and legal environment 
(Campbell 2007; Short & Toffel 2010), or individual agency (Howard-Grenville 2007). Although 
such issues are critically important, particularly where the benefits of socially responsible actions are 
contested or conflict with private gain, existing theories are less useful in explaining the paradox of 
profitable pro-social investments that are not adopted.   
A large literature addresses the issue in the context of energy efficiency.  Some economists argue 
that win-win opportunities cannot exist since rational managers would already have implemented 
them; alleged win-wins must therefore reflect overoptimistic assessment of costs and benefits 
(Gillingham et al. 2009, Jaffe et al. 2004, Sutherland 1991).  Others acknowledge the existence of win-
win investments and attribute underinvestment to market failures.  Organizations may lack access to 
the capital necessary to finance up-front investments. Asymmetric information problems can arise 
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when technology providers cannot credibly communicate the benefits to customers (Howarth & 
Sanstad 1995).  Principal-agent interactions can cause underinvestment, as in the famous “landlord-
tenant” problem:  when tenants pay the utility bill, landlords will underinvest in efficiency because 
they would bear the costs while the tenants reap the benefits (Jaffe & Stavins 1994).   
Behavioral biases can also lead to underinvestment.  Managers may evaluate projects from the 
parochial perspective of their organizational function rather than what’s best for the organization as 
a whole, choose investments with lower initial costs despite higher net present value (NPV) life-cycle 
costs, underweight low-probability/high-consequence risks, and bow to competitive and capital 
market pressures for short-term financial results (Bazerman 2009, Frederick, Lowenstein and 
O’Donoghue 2002, Rahmandad 2012, Yates & Aronson 1983). 
Certainly, costs can be underestimated, and market failures, principal-agent problems, behavioral 
biases and short-termism affect investment decisions.  Yet these explanations are only partly 
satisfactory.  Win-win investments are well documented and many organizations have benefitted 
(e.g. Creyts et al. 2007, Eichholtz et al 2010, Fuerst and McAllister 2011, Lovins 2012).  Large firms 
often have access to capital and strong incentives to overcome market failures and biases that limit 
profitability.  Yet many attempt to implement profitable pro-social investments only to see 
performance fall short of potential (e.g., Coglianese & Nash 2001).   
Failure to implement profitable opportunities afflicts improvement programs generally, not only 
pro-social opportunities (Keating et al. 1999, Repenning & Sterman 2002). From airline kitchens to 
health care, similar firms in the same industry and even different floors of the same hospital exhibit 
persistent performance differences despite financial incentives, market forces and the availability of 
improvement methods that should lead to broad diffusion of best practices (Gibbons and 
Henderson 2013, Wennberg 2010).  For example, total factor productivity varies by about a factor of 
two between the 10th and 90th percentile firms in the same 4-digit SIC industries in the US, and by 
more than a factor of five in China and India (Syverson 2011).   
We argue understanding the paradox of unexploited win-win investments requires us to consider 
not only the market failures, incentives, and behavioral biases that condition investment decisions, 
but also the dynamics of program implementation.  To do so, here we report a longitudinal study of 
energy use and facility maintenance at a large research university, the Massachusetts Institute of 
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Technology (MIT).  Like many universities, MIT is well positioned to exploit win-win opportunities.  
MIT has an explicit pro-social mission, long time horizon, substantial endowment, AAA credit 
rating, bears no shareholder pressure for short-term results, and as the owner-operator of its 
facilities, does not face landlord-tenant agency problems.  Nevertheless, in the past the Institute 
failed to exploit many win-win opportunities to improve its facilities and energy efficiency.   
We develop a novel simulation model of the Institute’s operations grounded in ethnographic 
interviews, archival records and quantitative data including maintenance, energy use and the 
condition and renewal costs of every system in every building on campus.  We use panel regression 
to estimate important physical and behavioral relationships, such as the rate at which energy 
efficiency deteriorates as buildings and systems age and how maintenance personnel allocate time to 
reactive vs. proactive maintenance.  We then use the model to explore why win-win opportunities 
were not taken.  We conclude that the Institute inadvertently became stuck in a capability trap 
(Repenning and Sterman 2001, 2002): a vicious cycle in which unreliable, inefficient facilities lead to 
high costs and a firefighting focus that prevent an organization from investing in the capabilities and 
programs needed to improve, thus perpetuating high costs and firefighting.  Escaping the trap is 
often difficult:  the first response to increased investment in process improvement is higher costs 
and/or fewer resources for urgent repairs, a Worse-Before-Better dynamic.  For example, in the 
short run, increasing proactive maintenance not only raises costs but requires reassigning technicians 
from repair to prevention and, often, taking operable equipment offline, cutting uptime.  
To begin, we extend the theory of the capability trap to the context of facilities management, 
maintenance and energy use.  Next, we describe the research setting, the simulation model and the 
data used to develop and test it.  We then use the model to explore policies to improve performance, 
including outcomes (do investments offer win-win benefits such as positive net present value and 
lower energy use?) and implementation dynamics (how long and deep is any worse-before-better 
tradeoff?).  We show how MIT, in part due to the work reported here, is overcoming the capability 
trap by investing in sustainable improvement.  Finally, we note limitations of the study and consider 
the generality of the results.  We close with implications for research and practice. 
THE CAPABILITY TRAP 
Repenning and Sterman (2001, 2002) developed the theory of the capability trap to explain the 
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failure of many process improvement programs; Sterman (2015) applies the theory to sustainability 
and pro-social investments.  Figure 1 shows the structure of the theory in the form of a causal 
diagram (Sterman 2000).  The managers of any process, whether production, product development, 
maintenance, human resources, or environmental quality, are responsible for the performance of 
that process against target or desired performance.  If performance falls short of the target, 
managers have two basic options to close the gap:  working harder or working smarter.  Working 
harder includes adding resources (hiring, capacity expansion), increasing resource utilization 
(overtime, shorter breaks, speeding up), and boosting output per person-hour by cutting corners 
(skipping steps, cutting testing, deferring maintenance, failing to follow safety procedures).  These 
activities form the balancing (i.e., negative) Work Harder feedback, B1:  a performance shortfall leads 
to longer hours, corner cutting, deferring maintenance, and other shortcuts that improve 
performance.  Alternatively, managers can interpret the performance gap as a sign that the 
organization’s capabilities are inadequate.  They can increase improvement activity designed to 
eliminate the root causes of poor performance and invest in the capabilities that make improvement 
effort effective, including investments that enhance people’s skills, knowledge of and adherence to 
best practices, and build cooperation and trust across organizational boundaries.  Investing in 
capability improvement forms the balancing Work Smarter feedback, B2.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Consistent with the resource-based view of the firm and theories of dynamic capabilities, the 
organization’s capabilities are shown as a stock.  Capabilities—including productive, well-maintained 
equipment, skilled workers, effective improvement methods, organizational routines, and trust 
between workers and management and across organizational boundaries—are assets that build up as 
the result of investment and erode over time as equipment ages, employees leave, and changes in the 
environment render skills, knowledge, routines and relationships obsolete. 
Working harder and working smarter interact because time and resources are limited.  When 
organizations are heavily loaded and resources constrained, greater work effort necessarily comes at 
the expense of maintenance, improvement, learning, training, coordination and other activities 
needed to preserve and enhance capabilities. The result is the reinforcing (i.e., positive) feedback 
denoted Reinvestment or Ruin (R1).  As the name suggests, the reinforcing feedback can operate as a 
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virtuous cycle that builds capabilities and performance, or as a vicious cycle that degrades both.  An 
organization that increases the time and resources devoted to improvement sufficiently will, after a 
lag, build capabilities that boost performance, easing the performance gap and yielding still more 
time and resources for improvement.  In contrast, if managers respond to a performance gap with 
greater pressure to boost output, improvement effort falls, the organization’s capabilities erode, and 
the throughput gap grows still larger, forcing ever-greater reliance on working harder.  The vicious 
cycle drives out improvement activity, leading to low capabilities and poor performance, and, all too 
often, environmental damage, accidents, or organizational failure.   
How could an organization allow itself to fall into the capability trap?  Consider managers and 
workers facing a performance gap.  Working harder—including overtime, corner cutting and 
deferring maintenance—will quickly boost output.  Effort and outcome are closely related in time 
and space, observable and quite certain: a 10% increase in work hours quickly yields about 10% 
more throughput.  In contrast, working smarter takes time, and both the length of the lag and the 
payoff are uncertain:  Improvement experiments take time and often fail, and it takes time to train 
people in improvement, develop routines and norms that prevent corner cutting, and build 
commitment, relationships, and trust.  These features bias many organizations toward working 
harder even when the payoff to working smarter is higher.   
Figure 2 illustrates using the example of maintenance in a manufacturing plant (Repenning and 
Sterman 2001, 2002; Carroll, Sterman and Marcus 1998).  Initially, the plant is performing well, with 
high uptime, product quality and safety.  Maintenance spending is largely devoted to proactive 
maintenance and improvement.  Now imagine a company-wide budget cut (due to recession, 
competition, or other cause).  The maintenance manager must cut expenses.  Reactive maintenance 
cannot be cut:  when equipment fails it must be fixed, lest plant uptime falls and customer 
commitments go unmet.  Instead, process improvement and proactive maintenance (defined here to 
include scheduled, preventive and predictive maintenance) suffer, along with part quality, equipment 
upgrades, training, and, all too often, adherence to safety protocols.  The first impact?  Maintenance 
costs fall, closing the budget gap, and plant uptime rises, because operable equipment is no longer 
taken down for proactive maintenance.  Soon, however, breakdowns and failures grow, increasing 
reactive maintenance and costs, further cutting proactive maintenance and improvement.  Worse, 
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falling uptime and output erode revenue, and budgets may be cut further, increasing pressure to cut 
proactive maintenance and process improvement.  The plant becomes trapped in a vicious cycle of 
increased breakdowns, higher repair costs, lower uptime, greater production and financial pressure, 
less improvement effort and still more breakdowns.  Soon, the organization finds itself in a paradox:  
it spends more on maintenance than the industry average, yet gets less for it.   Risks to the health 
and safety of employees and the community rise as equipment deteriorates.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Now consider what happens when the organization seeks to escape the trap.  Figure 3 shows a 
plant with high costs and low uptime, reliability, safety and quality.  At time t1, managers initiate a 
major improvement program.  The first impact?  Costs rise while uptime and output fall.  Costs rise 
because the organization must increase proactive maintenance and improvement activity, while still 
carrying out reactive repair work at the same rate.  Uptime and output fall because operable 
equipment must be taken off line to perform proactive maintenance and test improvement ideas.  In 
many organizations, the next impact is the abandonment of the improvement initiative. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
What happens, however, if the organization doesn’t give up when costs rise and uptime falls?  
After a new improvement program is started (at t2 in Figure 3) the gradual growth in capabilities 
eventually begins to boost performance.  Breakdowns begin to fall, uptime and output rise, and the 
burden of reactive maintenance eases, freeing up resources that can be reinvested in further 
capability development:  the Reinvestment or Ruin feedback now operates as a virtuous cycle, 
bootstrapping the plant to low costs and high performance.  Note, however, that the system exhibits 
Worse-Before-Better (WBB) behavior.1    
The theory of the capability trap yields three main insights:  First, sustainable improvement 
requires transforming the vicious cycle into a virtuous cycle of improved performance, lower costs, 
greater investment in capabilities, and still better performance.  Second, doing so creates Worse-
                                                
1 WBB behavior also arises in economics and investment theory, where it is typically known as the “J curve”.  For 
example, the cash flow of a (successful) investment typically begins at zero, becomes negative, and only later becomes 
positive, tracing a “J” shape; a currency devaluation initially worsens the balance of payments, but later may improve it as 
imports fall and exports rise.  See e.g. Giovannetti (2008). 
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Before-Better behavior because of the lag between investment in capabilities and results.  Third, the 
system exhibits a tipping point because capabilities are stocks.  To escape the trap, the investment in 
capabilities must be large enough so that capabilities are built faster than they decay. Managers may 
be willing to increase resources for improvement, despite the short-run costs, but unless those 
investments are large enough and sustained long enough to build capabilities faster than they erode, 
performance will still gradually deteriorate.  
As a metaphor, consider the organization as a leaky ship.  To save the ship the captain may order 
the crew to bail, accepting that doing so will slow progress, at least temporarily, as those who bail 
cannot also sail.  But to avoid sinking it is not enough for the crew to bail.  They must bail faster 
than the water leaks in.  Similarly, managers may boost resources for improvement, knowing that 
performance will suffer in the short run, and may do so by what they consider to be substantial 
amounts relative to the organization’s past or peers.  But no matter how large the increase in 
resources for improvement, if it fails to build capabilities faster than they erode, capabilities will still 
fall.  When the program fails to reverse the decline in performance, managers—or their 
successors—are likely to abandon it, leading organizations to give up too soon.   
The original capability trap work (Repenning and Sterman 2001, 2002), however, does not 
provide a means for managers to determine how to escape the trap, including how much and how 
long to invest in different capabilities, how to coordinate those investments, how to evaluate their 
likely operational and financial benefits or how to estimate the depth and duration of the WBB 
dynamic.  Here we advance the theory by (1) showing that escaping the trap requires coordination of 
multiple capabilities and their interactions, and (2) developing a formal simulation model, grounded 
in qualitative and quantitative data, that allows us to design policies for improvement and assess 
their resource requirements and likely outcomes.  Our theory and model explicitly disaggregate 
capabilities and the determinants of performance.  We model the number and productivity of staff, 
the routines and decision rules used to allocate those resources to reactive or proactive maintenance, 
and how these interact to affect performance.  Performance is disaggregated to include defects in 
equipment, their root causes, the condition of the buildings and systems and their energy efficiency.  
Each of these elements of the organization’s capabilities is a separate stock in the model, responding 
to maintenance and improvement effort with different costs and lags.  Interactions among these 
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stocks play a major role in the dynamics and the response of the system to policies.  
Our work has implications for theorists and practitioners.  For theorists, we demonstrate the 
importance of explicitly modeling the determinants and interactions of different organizational 
capabilities, ranging from those embodied in physical infrastructure (e.g., defects in equipment, 
building condition) to those embodied in human capital and organizational routines (e.g., 
maintenance technician skills and attitudes, routines for carrying out maintenance work, how people 
respond to financial and schedule pressure).  Unfortunately, scholars have all too often treated these 
issues separately:  theory and models in the operations management literature tend to focus on the 
physics of the system, while the organizational behavior literature tends to focus on decision making, 
norms, group dynamics.  For practitioners, the model we develop provides a tool they can use to 
determine how much to invest in each critical capability, how to coordinate those investments, and 
to assess the costs, benefits and WBB dynamics likely to result.  The model, though calibrated to 
MIT, is fully documented and can be modified to represent other organizations.  
RESEARCH SETTING & METHODS 
We study the case of facilities maintenance and energy usage at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), a large research university.  For several reasons, universities are an excellent 
context in which to study the paradox of win-win investments that are not taken.   
First, win-win opportunities in facilities and maintenance are well documented.  Maintenance 
professionals have long known that inadequate maintenance is costly and inefficient (e.g., Moubray 
1997, Levitt 2009) and, through, e.g., poor HVAC performance and equipment failures, increases 
energy use, GHG emissions and operating costs, cuts occupant comfort and creates safety hazards. 
“Green” buildings consume significantly less energy than existing facilities or facilities built to 
current building codes, and many of these offer positive NPV and short payback times (e.g. TIAX 
2005, Perez-Lombard et al. 2008, Charles 2009, Martani et al. 2012, Heo et al. 2012).  Second, 
universities have a pro-social mission and do not experience shareholder pressure for short-term 
results.  Some, including MIT, have large endowments that generate funds and buffer them from 
variations in cash flow, and AAA credit ratings providing access to low-cost capital.  Third, as 
owner-operator of its facilities, MIT does not face landlord-tenant agency problems.  
We employ a mixed-methods research approach including ethnographic interviews with 
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members of MIT’s maintenance organization and administration, statistical analysis of building 
performance data, and simulation modeling.  Qualitative data was collected beginning in 2007.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 individuals spanning the repair and maintenance 
(R&M) organization, the department of facilities, and university administrators.  Interviews lasted 
between 45 and 120 minutes and were recorded.  We interviewed hourly maintenance mechanics, 
supervisors, and managers.  Individuals were asked to describe their history with the organization, 
their daily activities, challenges they faced in their work, and their views regarding department 
policies and priorities.  We also interviewed representatives of academic departments and MIT 
engineers, analysts, and administrators charged with facilities administration, capital renewal projects, 
utilities, and finance.  Interviewees were asked to explain department policies, investment priorities 
and their views regarding opportunities for improved performance and energy efficiency.   
The model simulates the condition of building stocks and systems, their energy use, building 
aging and renewal, and maintenance activity from 2005 through 2030.  We use the system dynamics 
method (Sterman 2000), which is widely used to model the dynamics of complex organizations (e.g., 
Sterman et al. 1997; Sastry 1997; Repenning 2002, Repenning & Sterman 2002; Morecroft 2007; 
Rudolph, Morrison & Carroll 2009; Walrave, van Oorschot & Romme 2011; Freeman, Larsen & 
Lomi 2012).  We build on existing system dynamics studies of service delivery and maintenance 
operations (Carroll et al. 1997, Ledet 1999, Oliva & Sterman 2001, Sterman 2000 pp. 66-79). 
Maintenance and Energy Use at MIT 
MIT operates a large, diverse campus.  As in many organizations, the R&M organization is part 
of a larger facilities group that is also responsible for new construction, renewal (i.e., renovation) of 
existing facilities, custodial work, utilities, security, and other operations.  The R&M group has 
approximately 100 employees organized into teams.  General maintenance groups are organized by 
zones of the campus and are supported by centralized groups of specialists including plumbers, 
HVAC mechanics, electricians, carpenters and others.  The daily activities of the R&M department 
are organized around an SAP work order system.  Work orders arise from two sources: “reactive” 
maintenance is work to resolve breakdowns and reported problems, and “proactive” maintenance 
includes scheduled, preventive and predictive maintenance, including inspections of equipment and 
scheduled replacements.  Many reactive work orders are directly initiated by members of the MIT 
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community who report problems with temperature, plumbing, lighting or other systems.  Academic 
departments also have facilities liaisons who work closely with R&M.   
Our interviews with maintenance personnel and MIT administrators revealed a central theme: 
maintenance operations are strongly driven by the large backlog of deferred maintenance—the work 
required to bring aging buildings and systems into conformance with current standards.  In 2007, 
MIT commissioned an engineering firm to perform a detailed assessment of the state of its 
buildings.  The report identified more than $1.4 billion (2007 dollars) in deferred maintenance.  
Examples include inoperable HVAC systems and controls; inefficient steam, electrical and plumbing 
systems original to the buildings; leaky single-glazed windows and cracks in building exteriors.  A 
facilities engineer with extensive experience in other organizations explained:  
 “Mechanically, [the buildings] are a mess.  A mess.  Here we have turn of the [20th] century 
buildings [and] a lot of those systems are still operational here.  It just amazes me.  Some of the 
systems I’ve seen here I’ve never seen anywhere else… To keep that equipment two to three 
times its life span and still be operational is kind of amazing.  But it can’t go on forever.  We’ve 
gone on 2 to 3 times the normal life span of some of the systems, and we’re still band-aiding 
them together….” 
The backlog of deferred maintenance forced the R&M group to become highly reactive.  
Between 2005 and 2007, more than 85% of maintenance hours were spent responding to customer 
calls reporting problems or breakdowns.  Approximately 40% were spent on urgent problems—
those requiring a response within 2-3 days or sooner—compared to best practice benchmarks of 
10% or less (Sullivan et al. 2010).  R&M personnel identified many ways in which the reactive, 
customer focus undermined effectiveness.  First, managers were unable to plan and schedule work, 
leading to inefficient time allocation and costly, expedited part procurement.  Second, work quality 
suffered: because mechanics had to attend to the next emergency, they couldn’t take the time to 
identify and resolve the root causes of problems.  As one mechanic explained,  
“It’s a fire drill… it’s who’s screaming right now.  So your priorities change on an hourly basis, 
probably a half-hourly basis during the day, and it’s kind of – it’s basically a constant fire drill.  
[You] kind of have a tendency to leave it once you get to a point where no one is complaining.”  
Reactive maintenance also crowded out the “behind the scenes” proactive maintenance and 
improvement necessary to prevent future breakdowns, as a supervisor explained:   
 “You know, we’re a customer service organization. It’s almost like we’re afraid to commit 
completely to the behind the scenes stuff, because we want to get to the visible stuff so quickly.  
That’s not spoken, but I think that’s – having the resources available – the customer doesn’t care 
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if a belt is flapping in a fan.  It might not matter for a year down the road, but to us it might be 
in January in the middle of the night that the fan shuts down – to us it’s important, but to the 
customer it’s not, so our resources go to what the customer wants, for the most part.”  
Deferred maintenance also increases energy use.  Cracks in walls and roofs lead to energy loss, along 
with costly water damage, and, in winter, burst pipes.  Dampers designed to reduce energy use by 
optimally mixing outside and conditioned air were rusted shut.  Failed HVAC controls and steam 
traps increased energy use and caused some buildings to overheat; occupants would then open their 
windows to cool off, even in winter.  The resulting breakdowns and customer calls kept the R&M 
staff from addressing the root causes of these problems, as a front-line mechanic described:   
 “If you maintain [systems] correctly, the amount of heat calls, cold calls, failures, breakdowns is 
a minimum.  We’re at the high level of breakdowns and heat and cold calls.  We’re doing as 
much PM [preventive maintenance] as we can within that timeframe, [but] something’s got to 
give.  So we tweak something until no one is complaining, and then… walk away.  I find systems 
that are heating and cooling at the same time because that makes the customer satisfied.”  
How did the Institute fall into the capability trap?  Crises such as the Great Depression, the 1987 
stock market crash, the implosion of the tech bubble in 2001 and the Great Recession of 2008 create 
temporary pressure to cut costs.  Yet interviewees with long tenure described continual budget 
pressure, as a mechanic with more than 30 years of experience observed:  
“I can’t think of a year that went by that we didn’t have a budget crunch....  There were so 
many years of flat budgets or very minimal increases.  In all my years here, this 
[maintenance] is one of the first places to get cut.” 
More important than the occasional fiscal crisis are the structural features that make it all to easy 
to begin a gradual slide into the capability trap.  Despite the conditions that should favor high 
performance noted above, universities such as MIT experience continual competition for scarce 
resources: labs seek new equipment; departments seek to expand their programs and hire more 
faculty; admissions wants to increase student financial aid, etc.  Long delays between cuts in 
maintenance and the resulting decline in capabilities, uncertainty over how long and large those 
impacts will be, and, especially, the failure to recognize the tipping point, however, mean pressure to 
maintain and improve facilities is weak.  Consider a ship under pressure to cut costs.  The captain 
can cut the crew without immediate consequence: by working harder, cutting corners and deferring 
maintenance, the remaining hands can still pump out the bilge as fast as the water leaks in.  Since 
corner cutting and capability erosion are difficult to observe the captain may interpret the result as a 
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productivity gain, reinforcing the wisdom of further cuts.  But as soon as bailing falls behind leakage, 
the water starts to rise.  The problem is initially small, may not be noticed, and doesn’t require 
urgent action.  But the “Reinforcement or Ruin” feedbacks begin to operate as vicious cycles.  As 
the water rises, it becomes gradually more dangerous to ignore the problem—and more costly and 
disruptive to address it.  In fact, the deferred maintenance problem is neither recent nor attributable 
to any one leadership team.  To the contrary, the problem grew gradually over the past century: 
“In his annual report for 1917, MIT president Richard C. Maclaurin wrote of the importance of 
‘clear[ing] ourselves of temporary embarrassments’ by ‘learn[ing] from actual experience over a 
period of time, and not merely from estimates, what the cost of the maintenance of our plant 
actually is.’ ” (Plotkin 2011) 
MODELING MAINTENANCE & ENERGY USE 
The simulation model captures both the physics of the facilities—e.g., building condition, energy 
use, equipment failures—and the behavior of organizational actors—e.g., the generation of 
maintenance work orders, their resolution by maintenance staff, and policies governing resource 
allocation to proactive and reactive work.  The model represents the approximately 130 individual 
campus buildings and the systems within them individually.  We model the current inventory of 
buildings and do not portray new facilities that may be added in the future.  We use multiple 
methods to estimate parameters including panel regression, partial model estimation (Homer 2012), 
interviews, archival data, expert judgment and prior literature. The model represents the expected 
lifetime, scheduled year for renewal and estimated renewal cost for all systems, by building, from 
2007 through 2030 (approximately 6700 items), using a detailed engineering assessment MIT 
commissioned (Supplement Figure S1 illustrates the level of detail and provides full documentation; 
here we describe the model structure and several key formulations). 
Feedback structure governing defects in building systems  
The concept of defects in building systems lies at the core of the model (Figure 4). Examples 
include worn fan belts, HVAC systems out of calibration, cracked windows or corroded steam line 
expansion joints.  Defects are either known or latent, undiscovered problems.  Defects are typically 
latent:  a pump with a leaky bearing seal can continue to operate for some time.  However, if not 
detected and corrected, the bearing will eventually seize and the pump will fail.  The stock of defects 
increases through defect creation and decreases through defect elimination, which can result from 
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reactive or proactive maintenance. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
New defects arise from equipment aging and wear, at a rate determined by the condition of 
buildings and systems.  Defects are also created by collateral damage arising from breakdowns:  A 
pump that fails under load can break piping and throw shrapnel that causes other damage.  These 
new defects can then cause other failures, shown as the reinforcing Collateral Damage feedback, R0.   
Breakdowns and poor system performance generate work orders for reactive maintenance; such 
work eliminates the defects that caused the failure or complaint, closing the balancing Working 
Harder: Maintenance feedback, B1.  Failures and complaints could also be interpreted as a signal that 
more proactive maintenance is needed.  Doing so would eliminate defects before they can cause 
failures, closing the Working Smarter: Maintenance feedback, B2.   
Although many R&M employees understood that it would be better to “work smarter” than 
“work harder,” constant pressure to resolve complaints and failures crowded out proactive work, as, 
for example, when mechanics “tweak something until no one is complaining.”  As mechanics 
increasingly respond to customer calls they have less time to perform preventive maintenance or 
search for and correct the root causes of problems, so proactive work declines.  Consequently the 
stock of defects continues to grow, causing more failures and further constraining the resources 
available for proactive work, shown as the reinforcing Reinvestment or Ruin feedback R1.  Interviewees 
explicitly described the tradeoff between reactive and proactive work they constantly made:  
“This [equipment] is supposed to be looked at every week – well, I can’t get to that every 
week because of our limitations, so we’ll try to do all those weekly tasks every month or two 
months – a lot of stuff is only getting looked at once or twice a year because we don't have 
the resources to do it.” – Maintenance Manager A 
“We have a lot of what’s called deferred maintenance around here – basically, equipment 
that if you look at the recommendations, are well beyond their useful life… We could do 10 
roofs this year if we had a lot of money, but we don’t, so we do two roofs, that kind of 
thing.  We look at the worst ones, we look at the ones that give us the most trouble or 
maybe cost us the most money on an operating [basis], and we pick those to try to get 
ourselves out of trouble.” – Maintenance Manager B 
Expanding the boundary o f  the model : Our model expands the boundary of the original capability 
trap theory to capture, endogenously, the determinants of the condition and energy efficiency of 
campus buildings and systems (Figure 5).  Like any assets, buildings and systems gradually 
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deteriorate and must eventually be renewed or replaced.  The condition of the buildings and systems 
within them are stocks:  If renewal (including retrofits and replacement) falls below deterioration, 
the condition of the buildings and systems declines, increasing defect creation.  
 The energy efficiency of buildings and systems, shown above the stock of building and system 
condition in Figure 5, also degrades over time as windows crack, insulation settles, gaps open in 
walls and roofs, pipes corrode, etc.  Maintenance can partially compensate—windows can be 
repaired, cracks patched, ducts cleaned, etc.  Building renewal also improves energy efficiency 
somewhat because building codes have generally tightened over time.  However, efficiency can be 
improved further—at some additional cost—by installing windows, HVAC equipment, insulation, 
lighting, and other systems that are more efficient than code requires.   
 The physical processes, routines and decision rules governing the evolution of building 
conditions and energy efficiency interact to create additional capability trap feedbacks.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 First, just as collateral damage from equipment failure can create new defects, failures and 
breakdowns can degrade buildings and systems and compromise energy efficiency.  A crack in a wall 
not only wastes energy, but on a cold night might cause sprinkler pipes to freeze and burst.  The 
resulting flooding can damage structures, electrical and mechanical systems, and lab equipment, 
creating additional reinforcing Collateral Damage feedbacks, shown in Fig. 5 as R0b, in addition to the 
original reinforcing loop (now labeled R0a).   
 Second, endogenously modeling building condition creates new reinforcing feedbacks around 
facilities renewal.  As the condition of buildings and systems deteriorates, the rate of defect creation 
increases.  Eventually, breakdowns, failures and complaints increase, raising O&M costs.  Higher 
O&M costs create financial pressure, reducing funds available for building and system renewal.  
With inadequate renewal the condition of buildings and systems deteriorates further, leading to still 
more defects and still higher costs, creating the reinforcing Reinvestment or Ruin: Renewal feedback, R2.  
 Third, as energy efficiency degrades through aging, wear, and collateral damage from failures and 
breakdowns, energy use increases, raising operating costs, intensifying financial pressure, reducing 
the funds available for efficiency upgrades and leading to still higher energy use, forming the 
reinforcing Reinvestment or Ruin: Efficiency feedback, R3. 
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 Fourth (not shown in Fig. 5), the effectiveness of investments in buildings, systems and energy 
efficiency depends on the policies, routines and other capabilities of the organization.  Effective 
renewal and efficiency investments require a holistic, systems approach, often called an integrated 
design process (Kinsley and DeLeon 2010, Moser et al. 2012, Parish and Regnier 2013).  It is 
generally more cost effective to plan lighting and office layout early in a project along with decisions 
about building orientation and window size so natural light can be maximized, and to coordinate 
renewal of all systems in a building rather than renovating piecemeal.  Doing so, however, requires 
more up-front planning and greater coordination among design and engineering specialties, and 
among the facilities department, building occupants and senior leadership.  The stronger these 
intangible capabilities, the more likely the Reinvestment or Ruin feedbacks will operate as virtuous 
cycles and the stronger they will be, creating another layer of reinforcing feedbacks.   
Model ing de fec t s ,  work orders and corner cut t ing : In addition to the stocks of defects shown in 
Figure 5, the model explicitly represents the backlogs of maintenance work orders for reactive and 
proactive work, the flows of work order creation and resolution that alter them, and the routines and 
decision rules governing the allocation of R&M resources between reactive and proactive work.  We 
disaggregate defects and the work orders they generate into six categories using an industry standard 
classification scheme: exterior structures, interior structures, plumbing, electrical, HVAC, and other.  
For each category 𝑖 ∈ {1,… 6}, we represent two types of work orders: Reactive and Proactive 
(𝑗 ∈ {𝑅,𝑃}).  New work orders of each type accumulate in a backlog until they are closed.  New 
reactive work orders, Oi,R, arise as latent defects lead to breakdowns, failures or customer complaints: 𝑂!,! = ℎ!𝐷!,  (1) 
where Di is the stock of defects in category i and hi is the hazard rate that a defect that category will 
lead to a failure or complaint that generates a reactive work order.  We estimated the hazard rates 
from time series data on work orders and the stock of deferred maintenance in each category and 
from expert judgment of R&M and facilities personnel; as intuition suggests, defect generation rates 
are higher for mechanical systems, with their rotating equipment (motors, pumps, etc.) than for the 
structural elements of buildings (the supplement shows the formulation for proactive work orders).   
The rate at which work orders for each category and type are closed, 𝐶!,! , is given by the total 
effort of the R&M department, determined by the number of maintenance personnel, N, average 
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work hours per week, H, the share of that effort allocated to each category and type of work, and 
worker productivity for each: 𝐶!,! = 𝑁𝐻𝑓!𝑠!𝑝!,!  (2) 
where 𝑓! , 𝑖 ∈ 1,… 6 , is the fraction of total maintenance effort allocated to each of the six work 
categories; 𝑠! is the share of total available work hours done Reactively or Proactively; and pi,j is the 
productivity of maintenance effort for each category and type of work.   
Interviews and archival records showed that the R&M headcount, N, was relatively constant 
over the estimation period.  Given budget constraints, the R&M organization did not have the 
ability to expand. 
Both work hours and productivity may vary with the load on the R&M organization (Oliva and 
Sterman 2001, Repenning and Sterman 2002).  When pressure to complete work is high, mechanics 
may put in longer hours and may also close work orders more quickly by cutting corners, including 
spending less effort searching for and eliminating the root causes of the problem.  We estimated 
these effects using work order data from the Institute’s SAP system including hours worked, 
productivity and the allocation of time to different types of maintenance work, specifying:  𝐻 = 𝐻∗𝑤!!  (3) 𝑝!,! = 𝑝!,!∗ 𝑤!!  (4) 
where 𝐻∗ is the standard work week, the 𝑝!,!∗  are the base productivities of each category and type of 
work, w is work pressure, and γP and γH are the sensitivities of productivity and work hours to work 
pressure, respectively.  Work pressure, w, is the ratio of the total work hours needed to complete all 
work on schedule to the work hours available given the headcount and standard workweek.   
Regression results yield a highly statistically significant response of productivity to work 
pressure, with γp = 0.14, (t = 2.71, p < .0001).  The results provide evidence of corner cutting (Oliva 
& Sterman 2001) and are consistent with the interviews, in which technicians described how high 
work pressure forced them to “leave it once you get to a point where no one is complaining” and 
“tweak something until no one is complaining, and then…walk away.”  The model captures these 
impacts of corner cutting:  when less time is spent on each work order, the number of defects found 
and eliminated falls, and the number of defects created from poor quality work increases. 
The estimate for the sensitivity of the workweek to work pressure, γH, although positive, was not 
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statistically significantly different from zero.  The low sensitivity of work hours to workload is 
consistent with both the interviews and work hour data: overtime was rare and more often used for 
scheduled shutdowns than to catch up when work pressure was high.   
 We assume maintenance effort across the six categories (both reactive and proactive), fi, is 
allocated in proportion to the total desired rate of work completion in each category.  We use a logit 
choice model to determine the share of time allocated to reactive and proactive work (see the 
Supplement).  Consistent with the interviews, estimation results show that urgent, reactive work 
orders squeeze out proactive work.  To illustrate, the large volume of reactive work orders yields a 
simulated allocation of approximately 91% reactive and 9% proactive work for 2005, close to the 
actual split.  Further, if the volume of scheduled proactive work doubled, while the reactive 
workload remained the same, the proactive fraction of work would rise only to about 10%.    
Model ing energy use :  We estimated the relationship between energy use and building and system 
condition using data on energy consumption per gross square foot (gsf) for each building and for 
each of the three main energy carriers: steam, chilled water and electricity between 2000 and 2006.  
We ran panel regressions for each energy carrier and each building, with time (a proxy for building 
age) as an independent variable, fixed effects for buildings and controls for annual heating and 
cooling degree-days.  Results show highly statistically significant (p < .0001) time trends for all three 
energy carriers.  Electricity use is rising fastest as it includes both the impact of aging and rising plug 
loads as the density of electronics has risen (a process co-linear with building aging).  Rising steam 
and chilled water use, however, are predominantly driven by building and equipment deterioration.  
Changes in energy efficiency are not likely to be linear over longer time horizons.  We posit that 
energy efficiency decays exponentially over time, consistent with Toole & Claridge (2011).  We 
estimated the exponential decay model using two methods (detailed in the Supplement).  We then 
use the results to estimate the potential energy savings available from building renewal.  We find that 
if every building and system were fully renewed, energy use per gsf would fall by 55% for chilled 
water, 41% for steam and 23% for electricity relative to 2005 levels.  For comparison, the new 
management school building, completed in 2010, uses less than half the energy per gsf than the 
ASHRAE 90.1 energy standards for comparable low-rise commercial buildings.  Energy use for 
lighting is 55% less than the standard, and heating and cooling loads are 52% and 53% less than 
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values for comparable MIT office/classroom buildings, respectively.  The investments to achieve 
these reductions increased the capital cost of the building by less than 1% compared to a standard, 
code-compliant building, yielding an NPV of about $10 million (Sterman et al. 2015).   
 The interviews, quantitative data and estimation results support the feedback structure shown in 
Figure 5.  That structure maps clearly onto the capability trap framework, but at multiple, interacting 
scales. R&M personnel felt strong pressure to resolve failures and customer complaints quickly, but 
resources were inadequate to do both.  Consequently, proactive work suffered and the organization 
gradually sank into the trap through the self-reinforcing build up of deferred maintenance, more 
frequent breakdowns and higher costs.  At the same time, insufficient renewal investment caused 
buildings, systems, and energy efficiency to deteriorate, increasing defect creation and pushing the 
maintenance organization farther into reactive work while also increasing operating costs.  The 
resulting financial pressure further limited maintenance building renewal.  The descent into the 
capability trap was gradual, over many decades.  By the 2000s the situation had become acute.  The 
result was the “fire drill” atmosphere in which R&M personnel responded to “who’s screaming right 
now,” which forced them to defer proper maintenance still further.   
 To escape the capability trap an organization must invest in capabilities faster than they erode, 
just saving a leaky ship requires the crew to bail at least as fast as water leaks in.  However, that 
insight alone, although poorly understood (Booth Sweeney & Sterman 2000, Cronin, Gonzalez & 
Sterman 2008), does not provide managers with sufficient guidance to select effective programs or 
allocate resources among maintenance, building and system renewal and efficiency investments.  
Doing so requires explicit consideration of the different stocks that constitute the organization’s 
capabilities and the interactions among them.   
 Consider again the leaky ship: to save the vessel the crew must bail faster than the water flows 
in.  But bailing is exhausting, and the more sailors tasked to bail the fewer are available to sail.  Thus 
the crew should also reduce the bailing required by plugging leaks faster than new ones spring.  To 
do so they must replace old boards and caulk faster than they rot and leak, but that further increases 
the workload or cuts the crew available to sail or bail.  These tradeoffs could be eased if the crew’s 
repair capabilities improved, but doing so requires building their skills faster than they decay, 
requiring, in the short run, still more time.   
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 In the same way, escaping the maintenance-building condition-energy efficiency capability trap 
requires crossing multiple tipping points:  To reduce the stock of reactive work orders, the rate they 
are closed must exceed the rate new ones are opened; to reduce the stock of defects, defect 
elimination must exceed defect creation; to improve the condition of buildings and systems, building 
renewal must exceed deterioration; to improve energy efficiency, upgrades must exceed efficiency 
degradation.  Finally, to increase the organization’s ability to carry out these investments effectively, 
intangible capabilities—skills, routines, cooperation and trust across disciplinary and organizational 
boundaries—must be built faster than they erode.   
 The costs and characteristic time delays of these activities differ substantially.  The feedbacks 
involving defects and the allocation of maintenance effort between reactive and proactive work are 
fastest:  latent defects (e.g., worn fan belts, leaky bearing seals, drifting thermostats) can create 
breakdowns and complaints with delays on the order of days to months, and reactive work is 
typically done within a few days.  In contrast, buildings and systems (e.g., walls, roofs, foundations, 
windows; HVAC, steam and chilled water systems; water and sewer lines) have lifetimes on the 
order of many decades, while repairs are more costly and can take months to years.  As seen below, 
the differential delays, costs, resources, and cross impacts of these different stocks strongly 
condition the dynamics, including the duration and depth of the WBB dynamic and the net present 
value and payback times of different policies. 
RESULTS 
 We start by simulating business as usual (BAU).  The BAU case assumes capital renewal 
spending of $19 million/year, the average rate between 1999 and 2010.  Maintenance spending 
begins at approximately $15 million/year but varies thereafter with the volume of work to be done.   
We assume energy prices remain constant in real terms (Table 2 presents sensitivity analysis).  The 
result (Figure 6) is continued deterioration of campus conditions and capabilities.  By 2030 the 
backlog of deferred maintenance is 5.6 times larger than the 2005 level as buildings and systems 
continue to deteriorate faster than they are renewed.  The rising stock of deferred maintenance 
boosts the rate of defect creation well beyond the capacity of the R&M organization to eliminate 
defects, raising the stock of defects to 2.54 times the 2005 level despite a doubling in maintenance 
staff forced by the growing number of breakdowns.  Energy use rises to about 1.6 times the 2005 
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level, while the proactive fraction of maintenance work sinks to 3.4%.  The organization remains 
caught in the vicious “ruin” feedbacks described in Figure 5 even as maintenance spending grows.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Failing to Escape the Trap:  Surge Funding for Maintenance and Campus Renewal 
Figure 6 also shows two policies intended to reverse the deterioration.  The “Maintenance Surge” 
consists of a temporary $5 million/year increase in the R&M budget, roughly a third, from 2010 to 
2015.  The surge is intended to jump start the virtuous cycles of improvement by allowing more 
proactive work to be done.  Indeed, during the surge proactive R&M work rises from about 8% to 
nearly 30%, nearly stabilizing the stock of defects.  However, without additional capital renewal the 
deferred maintenance backlog and energy use continue to climb as under BAU.  Defects begin to 
grow again, even before the surge ends, forcing the R&M team to cut back on proactive work.  
When the surge ends proactive maintenance quickly falls back toward the BAU level.  The surge fails 
to lift the organization above the tipping point.  Using the leaky ship metaphor, the surge allows the 
organization to bail faster and even plug some leaks, but absent investments in campus renewal or 
energy efficiency new leaks still spring faster than old ones are patched.  Water flows in faster than 
even the expanded R&M organization can bail.  The ship soon begins to sink once more.2 
 The outcome is similar for a surge in campus renewal (“Renewal Surge” in Figure 6). Here 
capital renewal jumps from $19 million/yr to $150 million/year for five years (2010-2015), after 
which renewal spending returns to prior rates.  The renewal surge is similar in magnitude to the 
actual increase that began roughly at that time (except that, as described below, MIT plans to 
continue renewal efforts beyond 2015).  During the surge the backlog of deferred maintenance, 
energy use and the stock of defects all fall.  The drop in defects allows the proactive fraction of 
maintenance work to rise slightly, to a peak of 13%.  However, when the surge ends the backlog of 
deferred maintenance, energy use and defects all resume their rise, and the proactive maintenance 
fraction decays back towards the BAU level.  Despite investing $750 million in renewal, the 
organization does not escape the capability trap.  During the surge, capital renewal reduces the 
number of leaks, slowing the flow of water into the boat.  For a time, the rate of bailing slightly 
                                                
2 A large enough surge can push the R&M organization over the tipping point, but without capital renewal, at least $15 
million/year in additional R&M spending through 2030 is required (a total of $300 million in additional funds). 
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exceeds the rate at which water flows in, causing the water (the stock of defects) to fall gradually.  
But when the surge ends the number of leaks grows.  Water soon rushes in in faster than the crew 
can bail.  The ship again starts to sink. 
 In both cases, substantial investment in a single activity is not enough to escape the capability 
trap.  Significantly expanding the resources of the R&M organization increases the amount of 
proactive maintenance, but the poor condition of buildings and systems means defect creation 
continues to exceed defect resolution.  Similarly, a large surge in capital renewal removes some 
sources of defects, but the stock of deferred maintenance is so large that most maintenance work 
continues to be reactive, preventing the R&M organization from improving equipment reliability 
and efficiency or correcting latent defects before they cause breakdowns.  
Escaping the Capability Trap 
 We next simulate coordinated policies for capital renewal, proactive maintenance, and energy 
efficiency.  Figure 7 contrasts simulation results for four policies against the BAU simulation (Table 
1 summarizes the policies and results).   
Policy 1—Sustained Renewal:  In the “Sustained Renewal” case (Policy 1) campus renewal investment 
increases to $150 million per year beginning in 2010 and remains at that rate thereafter (a total of $3 
billion by 2030).  Maintenance policies remain as in the BAU case, and any savings from lower 
energy consumption are harvested, that is, used to support overall Institute programs.  The backlog 
of deferred maintenance falls steadily through 2030, to 29% of the 2010 level, $2.9 billion lower than 
the BAU case.  Renewal also stabilizes energy use slightly below 2010 levels (a drop of 29% from 
BAU by 2030).  Energy use does not fall as much as the stock of deferred maintenance: renewing 
buildings and systems upgrades their efficiency to current code, but then equipment and structures 
begin to deteriorate again.  At first, the R&M organization remains stuck in the reactive, firefighting 
mode.  But sustained renewal also gradually lowers the stock of defects, and by 2016 the proactive 
fraction of R&M work starts to increase.  The maintenance organization slowly escapes the 
capability trap, with the proactive fraction of work reaching 42% by 2030.  Sustained investment in 
renewal replaces rotting wood in the hull of ship with new oak, slowly reducing the rate at which 
new leaks spring.  Bailing eventually outpaces the flow of water into the ship.   
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Policy 2—Sustained Renewal with Maintenance Surge:  To speed improvement, Policy 2 augments Policy 1 
with a surge in the maintenance budget of $5 million/year from 2010 to 2015 (Figure 7; Table 1).  
The backlog of deferred maintenance and energy use change only slightly (none of the surge goes to 
renewal or energy efficiency).  However, the surge immediately increases the proactive maintenance 
fraction to 22%, cutting the stock of defects below Policy 1.  With fewer defects, still more time is 
available for proactive effort, which rises to 41% by 2015.  However, when the surge ends the 
proactive fraction immediately falls, ending only slightly higher than in Policy 1.  Compared to 
sustained renewal alone, the surge causes negative cash flow of approximately $4.8 million/year 
through 2015, slightly less than the $5 million/year surge because higher proactive work cuts 
breakdowns and collateral damage.  After the surge ends, these savings yield a small positive cash 
flow compared to Policy 1, but the savings do not outweigh the costs: the NPV of the maintenance 
surge relative to Policy 1 is $ –2.9 million.3  
Policy 3—Investing in Energy Efficiency:  Policies 1 and 2 assume that new buildings and systems are 
built to code.  However, additional investment in energy efficiency can lower the energy 
consumption of renovated plant and equipment beyond the requirements of building code.  Policy 3 
builds on Policy 2 by specifying that all renewal projects include additional investment in energy 
efficient structures and systems beyond the levels code requires.   Such investments include 
additional insulation, vapor and air barriers to eliminate air infiltration/exfiltration, high 
performance windows, energy recovery units in HVAC systems, variable speed lab hoods, LED 
lighting, occupancy sensors and many others—and the use of an integrated design process that 
coordinates building and system design to optimize the performance of the buildings and systems as 
a whole.  We conservatively assume that the extra investment yields half the potential efficiency 
improvement, at a cost of 2.5% of the base capital cost.  As before, any savings from lower energy 
are harvested, i.e., used to support general Institute programs.  The additional investment totals $85 
million by 2030.  By 2030 campus energy use falls 22 % below the 2010 level, far lower than the 
                                                
3 We use a discount rate of 5%/year, based on MIT’s actual cost of capital: since 2010 the Institute has issued $1.3 
billion in bonds to fund campus renewal at an average rate of approximately 5%/year. 
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level achieved by Policy 1.  Higher energy efficiency also yields spillovers to maintenance:  as 
documented above, much of the load on the R&M organization arises from occupant complaints 
that spaces are too hot or too cold.  Better windows and insulation, lower outside air infiltration, and 
better HVAC systems not only lower energy use but improve occupant comfort.  With fewer urgent 
complaints about temperature, the R&M organization finds itself with slightly more resources for 
proactive work, allowing the stock of defects to fall somewhat compared to Policy 2.  Additionally, 
lower defect levels reduce collateral damage from breakdowns (through the reinforcing Collateral 
Damage feedbacks R0 in Figure 5).  The cash flow of Policy 3 is initially worse than Policies 1 and 2, 
but the energy savings outweigh the cost of the extra investment in energy efficiency after only 3 
years.  Cash flow becomes positive in 2015, when the maintenance surge ends, and the savings 
continue to grow through 2030.  The additional investment in energy efficiency yields a positive net 
present value of $58.5 million relative to Policy 1, a discounted benefit/cost ratio of 1.70, while 
reducing cumulative campus energy use (and associated greenhouse gas emissions) by 7.9 trillion 
BTU (GBTU) by 2030, 14% of cumulative consumption from 2010-2030:  a substantial win-win. 
Policy 4—Reinvesting Energy Savings:  In Policy 4 we aim to speed the shift of the Reinvestment or Ruin 
feedbacks in Figure 5 from vicious to virtuous cycles by reinvesting the savings from lower energy 
use in further improvement.  We allocate 25% of the energy savings to further efficiency programs 
and 75% to the maintenance budget.  Reinvestment continues until 2020, when diminishing returns 
reduce the opportunities for productive use of these resources; after 2020 the savings add to general 
Institute revenue.  Reinvesting the energy savings strengthens the reinforcing feedbacks R1-R3 in 
Figure 5 by generating still more funds for efficiency; reinvesting in maintenance cuts new defect 
generation, generating still more resources for proactive maintenance.  The policy generates $173 
million in additional investment by 2030, yielding substantial benefits.  By 2017 the proactive 
fraction of R&M effort exceeds 70%, further accelerating improvement; by 2020 defects are 68% 
lower than Policy 3, reducing collateral damage, which further improves the condition of plant and 
equipment.  Cumulative energy savings through 2030 are 12.9 GBTU, a gain of 63% over Policy 3.  
The policy enables the Institute to escape the capability trap and enjoy higher quality, more efficient 
facilities and a safer campus—all for the same initial investment.  The reinvestment policy intensifies 
the worse-before-better tradeoff:  program cash flow falls farther and remains negative longer than 
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under Policy 3, but the NPV of the program rises from $58.5 to $98.5 million, a 68% gain. 
Reinvestment substantially increases the win-win benefits. 
Sensi t iv i ty  Analys is :  Important assumptions in the model are uncertain.  Table 2 summarizes 
results of sensitivity analysis across three critical uncertainties:  the discount rate, energy prices, and 
the potential for energy efficiency improvement.  MIT’s actual cost of capital for investments in 
campus renewal is about 5%/year.  Under that base case assumption, Policy 4 yields an NPV of 
$98.5 million, a discounted benefit/cost ratio of 1.73.  At a discount rate of 3%/year the NPV rises 
to $284 million, a discounted benefit/cost ratio of 2.7.  Under a discount rate as high as 9%/year, far 
higher than MIT’s actual cost of capital, the program still yields a positive NPV of $7.5 million and a 
discounted benefit/cost ratio of 1.08.  Future energy prices are highly uncertain.  Many argue that 
prices are likely to rise as economic growth, particularly in developing nations, increases energy 
demand, and as policy responses to the risks of climate change increase fossil fuel prices.  Similarly, 
innovation is increasing the potential for energy savings.  Alternatively, petroleum prices fell 
dramatically in 2014 and may remain low for some time, and potential efficiency gains may be lower 
than we assume.  Hence we varied assumed future energy prices from 20% below the base case to 
50% above them, and the potential for efficiency improvements from 25% below the base case to 
10% above it.  The coordinated program of energy efficiency with reinvestment of savings remains 
the superior policy even under the pessimistic assumptions, with NPVs of $77 million under low 
improvement potential and $61 million under low energy prices.     
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
IMPACT:  CAMPUS RENEWAL AT MIT 
We began this study in 2007.  Since then MIT has implemented substantial changes to its 
maintenance, energy and campus renewal policies following the recommendations above.  Since 
2010 the Institute has issued $1.3 billion in bonds to fund major investments in facilities renewal and 
energy efficiency to reduce the stock of deferred maintenance.  The current leadership team is 
committed to eliminating the backlog of deferred maintenance and is boosting total spending for 
campus renewal (including new construction, which we do not include in our model) to $200 million 
per year.  Efficiency and sustainability programs are central to the effort:  both new construction and 
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retrofits are designed to meet the LEED Silver standard as a minimum, and many projects since 
2010 have achieved LEED Gold, with documented energy and other savings generating large 
financial benefits (Sterman et al. 2015).  The R&M organization now emphasizes proactive 
maintenance and improvement, and is carrying out efficiency programs such as lighting and 
plumbing upgrades as a routine component of ongoing maintenance work.  Under the 
Comprehensive Stewardship Program, dedicated maintenance teams carry out proactive 
maintenance of key zones of the campus. 4  The savings have been substantial.  Consider the biology 
building, built in the early 1990s.  Defects had crept in to the equipment after years of mostly 
reactive maintenance.  Sensors and controls had drifted so that the building was heating and cooling 
itself simultaneously.  Eliminating that waste, along with basic HVAC system cleaning and repairs, 
yielded immediate energy savings worth about $360,000/year.  The total cost of the program was 
about $150,000 (Halber 2010).  The savings were so large and immediate that there was essentially 
no WBB behavior.  Similar results have been realized in other buildings by carrying out long-
deferred basic maintenance, such as cleaning steam traps.  MIT is working with other organizations 
to build on these results.  In 2010 the Institute partnered with the local electric utility to reduce 
campus electricity consumption.  The $13 million program targeted a 15% reduction in electricity 
use, totaling 34 million kWh over the three-year program.  Actual reductions exceeded the targets 
every year, generating $4.4 million/year in operating cost savings, a projected total of $50 million 
over the life of the improvements, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20,000 tCO2/year.  
The program has been renewed and expanded to include natural gas.5  The Institute is reinvesting a 
portion of the savings in further improvement.   
 Finally, the Institute is building the intangible capabilities needed to enhance the effectiveness of 
these investments, including appointment of a campus sustainability director, reporting to the 
Executive Vice President (who oversees all campus operations including the management of the 
endowment and finances), coordination of previously disparate sustainability initiatives, commitment 
to use of the Integrated Design Process on all capital projects, and training in proactive best 
practices for R&M and facilities department staff.   
                                                
4 See http://web.mit.edu/mit2030/themes/renovation-renewal-stewardship/csg-program.html. 
5 See http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2013/mit-nstar-extend-energy-efficiency-program-0702 and 
http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2013/energy-savings-add-up-to-success-for-efficiency-forward. 
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DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION: HOW TO SAVE A LEAKY SHIP 
Profitable opportunities to improve organizational performance while benefitting society are 
well documented, yet such “win-win” investments are often not implemented.  The prevalence of 
unexploited win-win opportunities is not fully explained by existing theories emphasizing 
shareholder pressure for quick returns, behavioral biases, market failures and principal-agent 
problems such as the landlord-tenant problem.  The case of energy efficiency and facilities 
maintenance at MIT yields new insights into this puzzle.  MIT has a large endowment, AAA credit 
rating and low cost of capital, an explicit pro-social mission, and as owner-operator of its facilities, 
does not face landlord-tenant problems.  Nevertheless, over many decades the Institute gradually fell 
into the capability trap, accumulating a large backlog of deferred maintenance that raised energy, 
maintenance and other operating costs, forcing the maintenance organization into a reactive, 
firefighting mode and preventing the investments needed to improve.  We extended the theory of 
the capability trap to account explicitly for multiple capabilities and how they interact, including 
maintenance, capital investment to renew buildings and systems, and energy efficiency.  To do so we 
developed a formal simulation model, grounded in ethnographic study and detailed quantitative data 
on maintenance and facilities management, energy use, and the condition and renewal costs of every 
system in every building on campus.  We use these data to estimate important physical relationships, 
such as the rate at which energy efficiency deteriorates as buildings and systems age, and critical 
behavioral decision rules, such as how maintenance personnel allocate time to reactive vs. proactive 
maintenance.  The results illustrate five reasons it is difficult to escape the capability trap and 
implement win-win opportunities, and how to overcome them: how to save a leaky ship. 
1. To survive we must reassign hands from sailing to bailing, which will temporarily slow our progress.  More 
generally, lags in capability development mean organizations experience “Worse-Before-Better” 
behavior: when programs to build capabilities are launched the first response is a drop in 
organizational performance as resources are added or reassigned from firefighting to improvement, 
and as operable equipment is taken offline so that improvement work can be done.  Escaping the 
trap and implementing win-win investment opportunities requires all relevant stakeholders 
understand and be prepared for the worse-before-better dynamic.  If not, people, from senior 
leaders to front-line workers, may react to the initial drop in performance and/or rise in costs as 
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evidence that the new policies don’t work, abandon the program, and become cynical about the 
possibility of improvement (Repenning and Sterman 2002, Keating et al. 1999).  For MIT (or for-
profit firms), these stakeholders range from the senior leadership, who set governance policies, goals 
and budgets and evaluate the performance of departmental managers, to the managers in those 
departments who experience those goals, budgets and evaluations, to the front-line workers who 
choose every day whether to work harder or smarter.  Additional stakeholders at MIT include 
donors, alumni, students, and faculty; among for-profit firms stakeholders would include investors 
and analysts, supply chain partners, customers and regulators.   
Methods to assess the depth and duration of WBB behavior and set realistic goals include (i) 
estimating the “improvement half-life” of a process by assessing its technical and organizational 
complexity (Sterman 2015, Repenning et al. 1997); (ii) finding small, quick wins (Weick 1984) to 
moderate the Worse-Before-Better dynamic; and (iii) seeking synergies that yield increasing returns 
to investment.  For example, a small amount of insulation in a building will save a little on heating 
bills, but more insulation, better windows, and reducing air infiltration may lower energy use enough 
to downsize the heating system or eliminate it altogether, resulting in far greater savings with higher 
NPV and ROI than smaller investments (Lovins 2012, Sterman et al. 2015).  
 2.  Bailing is not enough:  To stay afloat, we must bail faster than water leaks in.  Because capabilities are 
stocks the system exhibits a tipping point.  To escape the trap, investment must be large enough to 
build capabilities faster than they decay. Managers may be willing to boost spending on 
improvement by what they believe to be large amounts relative to their past or peers, yet will still fail 
if those investments are not large enough and sustained long enough to build capabilities faster than 
they erode.  Many organizations do not measure or report their capabilities or fail to do so 
frequently enough to recognize whether they have crossed the tipping point (Rahmandad and 
Repenning, forthcoming).  Incentives, performance evaluations and the tendency to “shoot the 
messenger” create pressure to avoid reporting problems or, all too often, deliberately covering them 
up, as in the “Liar’s Club” observed in some product development processes (Ford and Sterman 
1998).  But it is possible to assess capabilities and note changes in them.  Capabilities embodied in 
physical infrastructure are comparatively easy to measure.  Useful metrics include backlogs of 
deferred maintenance, defect rates and rework in products, processes, product returns or warranty 
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claims.  Intangible capabilities such as organizational routines, employee skills, and trust within and 
across organizational functions and boundaries are harder to assess, but can be measured through 
benchmarking, customer and employee satisfaction surveys and testing and recertification programs 
as is routinely done in high-hazard settings such as aviation and the military.   
 3.  Bailing is not enough:  We must plug leaks faster than they spring, rebuild the hull faster than it decays, and 
improve our design and carpentry skills.  Even if the crew, through heroic efforts, can bail faster than the 
water flows in, bailing is exhausting and diverts the crew from sailing and other tasks necessary to 
survive:  it cannot be sustained indefinitely.  To save the ship the crew must not only bail faster than 
the water leaks in, but also patch leaks faster than they spring, reducing the flow of water into the 
bilge; deploy new, better materials faster than old ones decay, reducing the rate at which new leaks 
spring; and, crucially, build the crew’s skills in these activities.  Doing so will divert even more hands 
from sailing in the short run, intensifying the WBB dynamic (see point 1).  Generally, because there 
are multiple capabilities and multiple stocks of defects in any organization, there are multiple tipping 
points.  These range from defects in equipment and backlogs of deferred maintenance to inefficient 
systems to intangible organizational routines, skills, and attitudes.  Sustainable improvement requires 
understanding how these capabilities interact and implementing coordinated policies for 
improvement.  To do so, organizations should avoid the widely used strategy of organizational 
decomposition, with individual sites, divisions, or functions working their own improvement 
programs.  Organizations should approach the work of improvement as a system, explicitly 
considering the interactions among resources and capabilities through integrated design processes, 
cross-functional teams and other methods to enhance collaboration across organizational silos.   
 4.  To improve our effectiveness we must develop our ability to coordinate bailing, repair and design improvement.  
When the ship is sinking, it is tempting to put all effort into bailing and patching.  But that may not 
be sufficient—the crew may soon become exhausted, threatening morale or even mutiny.  The 
officers and crew should also invest in learning how to organize more effectively so that the limited 
time available builds the crews’ skills and productivity—and their will to carry out all these 
activities—faster than fatigue and failure sap energy and erode morale.  Generally, the ability to 
coordinate improvement in the ensemble of capabilities is itself a critical capability, one likely to be 
weak when stuck deep in the capability trap.  After years of downsizing and cost cutting, few 
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organizations today have any slack they invest in capabilities:  front-line workers are continually 
pressured to work harder; managers are told “do more with less” and face 24/7 work pressure 
through email and texts.  Although a venerable concept in organization theory, managers think of 
“slack” as “waste”—hence it is better to characterize it as “a strategic margin of reserve capacity.” 
Organizations without significant slack cannot increase bailing (reactive maintenance), leak repair 
(proactive maintenance), and hull redesign (process improvement) without improving productivity 
by learning to coordinate these activities better.  As part of its program of campus renewal, MIT not 
only increased investment in proactive maintenance and energy efficiency, but reorganized to 
coordinate these investments tightly with maintenance, facilities, operations and finance and to 
invest in training to build the skills needed to sustain improvement.  
 5.  As the need to bail eases, plug more leaks and strengthen the hull before sailing on.  After stabilizing the 
water level in the bilge it will be tempting to get underway immediately instead of using the crew 
freed up from bailing to plug and prevent new leaks so future bailing can be avoided.  The urge to 
make up for lost progress is powerful, but likely to cause another crisis when new leaks spring.  
Generally, savings from initial investment should be reinvested in further improvement.  Escaping 
the capability trap requires shifting the positive “Reinvestment or Ruin” feedbacks from vicious to 
virtuous cycles.  In the vicious cycle regime, managers often feel compelled to defer or cut 
investments in proactive maintenance, facilities renewal and efficiency upgrades as they find it 
increasingly difficult to attain cost and throughput targets.  If, despite these pressures, managers do 
the right thing and invest in improvement, they will then come under pressure to use the initial 
savings to close budget gaps or fund new programmatic activity.  Doing so is tempting: initial gains 
are immediately evident and would likely be rewarded, while the opportunity costs of harvesting are 
not directly observable.  But harvesting initial gains weakens or defeats the reinvestment feedbacks, 
preventing the organization from realizing many win-win opportunities, and possibly preventing it 
from escaping from the capability trap at all.  Mechanisms to promote reinvestment within 
organizations include revolving loan funds financed by program savings, gain-sharing programs in 
which a unit retains a large share of any savings for its own use, and performance evaluations and 
balanced scorecards that reward capability improvements.  External stakeholders (e.g., donors, 
funders, regulators) can encourage reinvestment through matching fund programs, tax credits, and 
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gain-sharing contracts (e.g., Power Purchase Agreements to promote renewable energy; stronger 
building codes combined with subsidies to fund retrofits for low and medium income households). 
 These five principles show how difficult it can be to escape the capability trap, but also point to 
policies for success.  To illustrate, consider the USS Constitution, a wooden-hulled frigate launched 
in 1797 in Boston, Massachusetts.  Known as “Old Ironsides” for her resilience under close cannon 
fire in the War of 1812, she saw active duty until 1881, and was designated a museum ship in 1907.  
Congress, however, did not appropriate sufficient funds for maintenance, so by the 1920s   
“she was starting to show the effects of her age and extended use. Faced with an ever-
diminishing budget and the veritable loss of a generation of skilled wooden ship builders, no 
large scale repair effort could be considered; rather, all repairs at the time were minor in 
scope, and primarily cosmetic…. The stern had decayed to the point of nearly falling off, 
and cement was being used to patch rotted areas in the ship’s decks and hull. Perhaps the 
most distressing news, however, was the rate at which Constitution was shipping water—
over two feet a day, necessitating a daily visit by a tugboat to pump her out.”6 
The Navy responded by carrying out a full renovation and the Constitution became one of the most 
popular tourist attractions in Boston.  Since then, the Navy has rigorously maintained and restored 
the ship, though doing so has meant periodic, multi-year layups in dry dock, during which she is not 
available to tourists.  Today Old Ironsides is the oldest commissioned naval vessel in the world.  She 
sailed under her own power in 2012 to commemorate her victories in the War of 1812.  And in 2015 
she entered dry dock again for another major restoration, projected to last three years.  
 Similarly, the MIT experience suggests how large organizations can escape the capability trap, 
yielding substantial win-win benefits.  We note, however, that although many actions have already 
paid back the initial investments, the ultimate test is whether organizational performance improves 
over the long term.  Follow up is needed to resolve uncertainties, learn from experience and 
continue to develop the capabilities needed for sustainable success. 
The dynamics described here are likely to apply to a wide variety of win-win investments.  
Although some investments in safety or environmental performance are simple technological 
upgrades, quickly implemented, many others require substantial organizational changes and long 
lags.  New technologies may cause disruptive and unpredictable changes to work routines and 
intergroup relationships (e.g. Barley 1986, Orlikowski 1992).  New organizational structures that 
                                                
6 USS Constitution Museum, National Cruise Scrapbooks, 1931-34, 
https://www.ussconstitutionmuseum.org/proddir/prod/495/39/. 
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support adherence to regulations, such as compliance offices and safety and environmental 
management systems, can produce similar effects (Kelly & Dobbin 2007, Huising & Silbey 2011).  
To make these technologies and management systems effective, organizations often must devote 
sizable resources to learning how to operate new technologies, resolve disagreements and 
interpretation challenges that emerge, coordinate across functions and build new cultures.  
Underinvestment in these less tangible capabilities can cause resistance and conflict that limit the 
effectiveness of technical and administrative innovations (Lyneis 2012). 
   Our results have implications for theories of self-regulation and corporate social responsibility.  
Scholars have long recognized that some organizations outperform others with regard to socially 
beneficial outcomes, even within the same industry and regulatory environment (e.g. Gunningham et 
al. 2003).  Understanding such variation, however, has proven to be more difficult.  Scholars point 
to differences in technical competency (Christmann 2000), local institutional pressures or legal 
environments (Bansal 2005, Marquis et al. 2007, Short & Toffel 2010) as important factors.  The 
literature on self-regulation also attributes performance variation to differences in the commitment 
of managers and workers who must identify, advocate for, and implement improvements (Roome 
1992, Henriques & Sadorsky 1999, Parker 2002, Gunningham et al. 2003).  The theory developed 
and tested here helps explain how commitment co-evolves endogenously with competence, 
capabilities, resource allocation, and performance.  
 In addition to commitment, technical competency, adequate capital and insulation from short-
term pressures, we suggest managers must also possess an understanding of the complex dynamics 
of organizational improvement.  Such understanding is often lacking (Repenning & Sterman 2001).  
Actors in complex systems routinely misperceive the effects of accumulations, time delays and 
feedback relationships (Sterman 1989, Paich & Sterman 1993, Moxnes 1998, Cronin et al. 2009).  
Managers often implement policies that are thwarted by unanticipated consequences, a phenomenon 
known as “policy resistance” (Sterman 2000) and that can lead to cynicism about the possibility of 
improvement (Sterman, Repenning and Kofman 1997, Keating et al. 1999). Commitment, self-
efficacy and belief in the power of individual agency should be seen as endogenous and co-evolving 
with the physical and institutional structure of the complex systems in which we are all embedded 
(Repenning and Sterman 2002, Sterman 2000).  Specifically, managers who fail to understand the 
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five principles above may underinvest, so capabilities continue to erode, albeit perhaps more slowly.  
They may then interpret the continued slide in performance as evidence that the program is failing 
and abandon it.  Even if they invest enough to get over the tipping point and are willing to endure 
the WBB behavior, they may then harvest initial savings, weakening the reinforcing feedbacks 
needed to escape the trap.   
 Like all studies, ours has limitations.  The capability trap and unexploited win-win opportunities 
are common in many contexts, but our study is specific to a particular organization.  First, follow up 
research should explore whether and how the dynamics we describe apply in other settings, 
including for-profit firms and government, and in contexts beyond facilities, maintenance and 
energy use such as working conditions (e.g., Locke 2013).  Second, although the model is grounded 
in a wide range of data, the conclusions are robust to major uncertainties, and we sought to make 
conservative assumptions throughout, the boundary of the analysis can be expanded further.  For 
example, we assume no technical progress that could increase energy efficiency potential or lower its 
costs.  We consider only energy and do not treat potential win-win opportunities from reducing 
water, toxic materials and other forms of waste.  We modeled the existing campus and did not seek 
to capture growth in programs and facilities.  We omit a range of impacts, from improved safety to 
the impact of better facilities on research productivity, student success, organizational reputation and 
occupant comfort that can improve morale, health, productivity, and the recruitment and retention 
of students, staff and faculty.  Although these benefits are difficult to quantify, research suggests 
they are much larger than the direct energy and maintenance savings (Heerwagen 2010, Miller et al. 
2009, World Green Building Council 2013). 
 Finally, while many investments offer win-win benefits, other pro-social policies that improve 
environmental quality and human welfare may not.  Society has justly banned slavery, child labor and 
many unsafe materials and working conditions despite the fact that these practices were highly 
profitable.  Here we sought to understand why well-documented win-win opportunities are so often 
unexploited.  Our results should not be misconstrued to suggest that pro-social actions are justified 
only if they are profitable.   
 Win-win investments enable organizations to become more socially responsible while improving 
their own performance.  Eliminating the barriers to implementation presents an important 
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opportunity for both scholarly research and practical action.       
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Figure 1.  The Capability Trap: Structure. 
 
 
  
 
Signs (‘+’ or ‘–’) at arrowheads indicate the polarity of causal relationships:  a ‘+’ denotes that an increase in 
the independent variable causes the dependent variable to increase, ceteris paribus (and a decrease causes a 
decrease); formally, X→+Y ⇔ ∂Y/∂X > 0.  Similarly, a ‘–’ indicates that an increase in the independent 
variable causes the dependent variable to decrease; that is, X→-Y⇔ ∂Y/∂X < 0.  Boxes represent stocks; 
arrows with valves represent flows.  A stock accumulates the difference between its inflows and outflows, 
e.g., Capabilities(t) = ∫[Investment in Capabilities(s) – Capability Erosion(s)]ds + Capabilities(t0).  See Sterman 
2000.  
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Figure 2.  The Capability Trap: Dynamics. 
 
 
 
Budget cuts at time t0 force the organization to cut proactive maintenance and improvement effort. As organizational 
capabilities fall, defects increase, increasing reactive maintenance and forcing further reductions in proactive 
maintenance and process improvement.  The self-reinforcing Reinvestment or Ruin feedback in Figure 1 operates as a 
vicious cycle, driving the organization to a state of high costs and low performance, reliability and safety. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Escaping the Capability Trap: Worse-Before-Better. 
 
 
 
Improvement effort is given priority at time t1, but the increase in costs and drop in uptime causes the organization to 
abandon the effort.  If a new effort begins (at time t2) and is not abandoned, the initial cost increase and performance 
drop eventually reverse, leading to lower costs and higher uptime, output, quality, reliability and safety, in a worse-
before-better pattern. 
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Figure 4: Feedback structure governing defect creation and elimination. 
The model represents every building separately.  Building systems and the stocks of defects associated with them are 
disaggregated into six categories: exterior structures, interior structures, plumbing, electrical, HVAC, and other. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Interacting Capabilities:  Expanding the boundary of the model 
Endogenously accounting for building and system condition, energy efficiency, operating costs and financial pressure 
creates new capability trap feedbacks.  The three main policies for improvement are shown in italics, including programs 
to improve maintenance, to renew buildings and systems, and to improve energy efficiency. 
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Figure 6: Results for Surges in Maintenance and Campus Renewal 
 
BAU: Business as Usual; Maintenance Surge: a $5 million/year increase in maintenance budget from 2010-2015 (over 
and above the BAU maintenance budget); (3) Renewal Surge: a surge raising the campus renewal budget to $150 
million/year from 2010-2015. 
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Figure 7: Results for Sustained Renewal Policies   
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
BAU: business as usual; Policy 1: Sustained Renewal of $150 Million/year 2010-2030; Policy 2: Policy 1 + $10 
Million/year maintenance surge 2010-2015; Policy 3: Policy 2 + Additional investment in energy efficiency; Policy 4: 
Policy 3 + Reinvestment of energy savings.  See Table 1 for details.   The supplement (Figure S23) shows total 
maintenance spending in the BAU scenario and Policies 1-4. 
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Table 1: Comparing Investments in Capital Renewal, Maintenance, and Energy Efficiency 
 
Policy: P1  P2 P3 P4 
  
Sustained 
Renewal 
P1 + 
Maintenance 
Surge 
P2 + Additional 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Investment 
P3 + 
Reinvestment 
of Energy 
Savings 
Cum. Investment in 
Renewal, 2010-2030 $3 Billion $3 Billion $3 Billion $3 Billion 
Cum. Investment in 
Maintenance, 2010-2015 0 $25 Million $25 Million $25 Million 
Cum. Additional Energy 
Efficiency Investment  0 0 $84.6 Million $74.1 Million 
Cum. Energy Savings 
Reinvested  0 0 0 $173 Million 
NPV of investment 
(relative to Policy 1)  0 $-2.9 Million $58.5 Million $98.5 Million 
Discounted Benefit/ 
Cost Ratio 
(relative to Policy 1) 
— 0.83 1.70 1.73 
Payback time (relative 
to Policy 1) — After 2030 12 Years 16 Years 
Cumulative energy 
savings relative to 
Policy 1 (GBTU) 
— 0.6 7.9 12.9 
 
 
Table 2.  Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
Base 
(Policy 1) 
Discount Rate 
(%/year) 
Energy  
Efficiency 
Potential 
Energy Prices 
  3%/yr 9%/yr +10% -25% -20% +50% 
NPV (relative to P1) 
(Million) $98.5 $284.0 $7.5 $106.9 $77.2 $60.8 $196.9 
Discounted 
Benefit/Cost ratio 1.73 2.69 1.08 1.79 1.58 1.46 2.39 
Payback time (years) 16 16 16 15 18 18 12 
Cumulative energy 
savings relative to  
Policy 1 (GBTU) 
12.9 12.9 12.9 13.5 11.3 12.7 13.1 
 
Values compare Policy 4 (continuous renewal + maintenance surge + additional investment in energy efficiency + 
reinvestment of energy savings) to Policy 1 (Continuous Renewal only).  Discount rate and future real energy prices 
assumed to be constant at the indicated ratio to base case values. 
